Naturally Savvy is an information-based website on the basics of natural health. They emphasize the importance of living a naturally healthy lifestyle and discuss how to integrate natural, organic and green products into your life.
Sunday, December 26, 2010
Friday, December 24, 2010
Must see media 2010
One to change the conversation...
Richard Heinberg Museletter #223 - on writing 'The End of Growth'
One to share with everyone you know...
300 Years of FOSSIL FUELS in 300 Seconds
One to challenge the accepted wisdom...
Fridley, Heinberg Discuss 'Peak Coal' in NATURE Journal
Nature Journal Podcast (4 minutes)
Thursday, December 23, 2010
Tuesday, December 21, 2010
Sustainable Urban Enterprise
It is not just the world’s mega-cities like Sao Paulo, Mexico City and Shanghai that will need to evolve in response to a range of issues like climate change, resource scarcity, population growth and changing lifestyles. All of Britain’s cities will need to look at how resilient they are in the context of these challenges. How can they provide the right environment for sustainable enterprise to flourish?
Businesses consider a range of issues when deciding where to locate, looking at practical issues such as proximity to market, transport and communication links. They want an environment that will attract the people who are crucial to business success. Businesses look to the public sector to provide incentives, support skills development and create places where their employees want to live.
But sustainability is also rapidly becoming a factor for forward thinking businesses as outlined by Forum for the Future in “Sustainable Urban Enterprise: creating the right business environment in cities” (Sustainable Urban Enterprise). Commissioned by economic development company, Opportunity Peterborough, the report found that traffic issues are the most prominent frustration with current business locations, with one in three business leaders citing poor public transport, traffic congestion or commuting times as their biggest gripe. But while efficient urban mobility will be become critical, a desirable business location will also mean access to a clean, green, and culturally vibrant city centre – enhancing the quality of life for employees and the visitor experience. Highly efficient and flexible ‘green’ premises are also likely to become more important for businesses.
The report, which aims to help cities to better understand and respond to future sustainability trends, outlines the following framework for creating a sustainable business environment:
Proximity to market - Think connectivity, rather than physical distance. Web-enablement, supply chain flexibility including local sourcing, and resilient logistics will all be important.
Communications - Think access, rather than movement. Interconnected low-carbon transport, reduced urban sprawl and ICT systems to connect people can support businesses and peoples’ work-life balance.
Access to resources - Think lower consumption, and higher quality of life. Regional supply chains and storage for key resources, resource-efficient infrastructure, recovery and recycling will all help cities ride out fluctuations in resource availability.
Provision of utilities - Think independent supply streams. Local energy generation, smart metering, smart grid technologies, and closed-loop utility systems, such as heat recycling can reduce a city’s environmental impact and enhance resilience.
Land/space premises - Think systematically about the interaction between buildings and the urban infrastructure around them. Urban planning needs to foster climate change adaptation and the provision of flexible, resource and energy efficient workspace.
Access to talent - Think about matching green skills to green business needs. A dynamic research sector for green skills, mechanisms for linking talent to ‘green’ jobs, programmes to boost sustainable skills and links to like-minded companies.
Attractiveness of place - Think about designing the city for people, not cars. Accessible amenities, attractive, walkable neighbourhoods with integrated business space and improved access to community information can enhance quality of life.
Government incentives - Think big AND small: infrastructure investments need to be big, but community planning should be small-scale. Cities need a clear vision of a sustainable future to guide bold investment in infrastructure, whilst fostering local entrepreneurship and innovation at the community scale.
Project Team
Ivana Gazibara, Senior Sustainability Advisor
Fiona Dowson, Senior Sustainability Advisor
Martin Hunt, Head of Built Environment
Sam Kimmins, Principal Sustainability Advisor
For more information contact
Ivana Gazibara:
i.gazibara@forumforthefuture.org 020 7324 3673
or visit: http://www.opportunitypeterborough.co.uk/
Businesses consider a range of issues when deciding where to locate, looking at practical issues such as proximity to market, transport and communication links. They want an environment that will attract the people who are crucial to business success. Businesses look to the public sector to provide incentives, support skills development and create places where their employees want to live.
But sustainability is also rapidly becoming a factor for forward thinking businesses as outlined by Forum for the Future in “Sustainable Urban Enterprise: creating the right business environment in cities” (Sustainable Urban Enterprise). Commissioned by economic development company, Opportunity Peterborough, the report found that traffic issues are the most prominent frustration with current business locations, with one in three business leaders citing poor public transport, traffic congestion or commuting times as their biggest gripe. But while efficient urban mobility will be become critical, a desirable business location will also mean access to a clean, green, and culturally vibrant city centre – enhancing the quality of life for employees and the visitor experience. Highly efficient and flexible ‘green’ premises are also likely to become more important for businesses.
The report, which aims to help cities to better understand and respond to future sustainability trends, outlines the following framework for creating a sustainable business environment:
Proximity to market - Think connectivity, rather than physical distance. Web-enablement, supply chain flexibility including local sourcing, and resilient logistics will all be important.
Communications - Think access, rather than movement. Interconnected low-carbon transport, reduced urban sprawl and ICT systems to connect people can support businesses and peoples’ work-life balance.
Access to resources - Think lower consumption, and higher quality of life. Regional supply chains and storage for key resources, resource-efficient infrastructure, recovery and recycling will all help cities ride out fluctuations in resource availability.
Provision of utilities - Think independent supply streams. Local energy generation, smart metering, smart grid technologies, and closed-loop utility systems, such as heat recycling can reduce a city’s environmental impact and enhance resilience.
Land/space premises - Think systematically about the interaction between buildings and the urban infrastructure around them. Urban planning needs to foster climate change adaptation and the provision of flexible, resource and energy efficient workspace.
Access to talent - Think about matching green skills to green business needs. A dynamic research sector for green skills, mechanisms for linking talent to ‘green’ jobs, programmes to boost sustainable skills and links to like-minded companies.
Attractiveness of place - Think about designing the city for people, not cars. Accessible amenities, attractive, walkable neighbourhoods with integrated business space and improved access to community information can enhance quality of life.
Government incentives - Think big AND small: infrastructure investments need to be big, but community planning should be small-scale. Cities need a clear vision of a sustainable future to guide bold investment in infrastructure, whilst fostering local entrepreneurship and innovation at the community scale.
Project Team
Ivana Gazibara, Senior Sustainability Advisor
Fiona Dowson, Senior Sustainability Advisor
Martin Hunt, Head of Built Environment
Sam Kimmins, Principal Sustainability Advisor
For more information contact
Ivana Gazibara:
i.gazibara@forumforthefuture.org 020 7324 3673
or visit: http://www.opportunitypeterborough.co.uk/
Monday, December 20, 2010
Peak energy, climate change, and the collapse of global civilization - The current peak oil crisis
by Tariel Mórrígan
http://newilluminati.blog-city.com/peak_energy_climate_change_and_the_collapse_of_global_civi.htm
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
“We are in a crisis in the evolution of human society. It's unique to both human and geologic history. It has never happened before and it can't possibly happen again. You can only use oil once. You can onlyuse metals once. Soon all the oil is going to be burned and all the metals mined and scattered.”
– M. King Hubbert1, geophysicist and energy advisor Shell Oil Company and USGS, 1983
“An additional 64 mbpd of gross capacity – the equivalent of six times that of Saudi Arabia today – needs to be brought on stream between 2007 and 2030.”
– International Energy Agency (IEA)2, 2008
“Peak oil” refers to the maximum rate of oil production, after which the rate of production enters terminal decline (see Figures 1 and 2). Although there will be oil remaining in the ground when world oil production peaks, the remaining oil will become increasingly difficult and more costly to produce until the marginal financial and energy cost of producing oil exceeds the marginal profit and energy gained.
Peak oil is happening now. The era of cheap and abundant oil is over. Global conventional oil production likely peaked around 2005 – 2008 or will peak by 2011. The peaking of oil will never be accurately predicted until after the fact.
Nevertheless, since mid-2004, the global oil production plateau has remained within a 4% fluctuation band (see Figures 20a and 20b, which indicates that new production has only been able to offset the decline in existing production. The global oil production rate will likely decline by 4 – 10.5% or more per year. Substantial shortfalls in the global oil supply will likely occur sometime between 2010 – 2015.
Global oil reserve discoveries peaked in the 1960's (see Figure 10). New oil discoveries have been declining since then, and the new discoveries have been smaller and in harder to access areas (e.g., smaller deepwater reserves). The volume of oil discovered has dropped far below the volume produced in the last two decades. In total, 507 fields are classified as ‘giant’, and account for 60% of conventional oil production. The top 110 producing oilfields produce over 50% of the global oil supply, and the most productive 10 fields contribute 20%. The top 20 oilfields contribute 27%. Production from 16 of the top 20 producing fields was also in terminal decline in 2007 (see Table 1).
Non-OPEC conventional production is projected to peak around 2010, and thereafter begin to decline. OPEC’s oil production will likely peak within the near-term. Saudi Arabia has more than 20% of the world's proven total petroleum reserves. After 2010, a steady terminal decline in oil production is projected at a depletion rate above 5% per year (see Figure 7). Huge investments are required to explore for and develop more reserves, mainly to offset decline at existing fields.
An additional 64 mbpd of gross capacity – the equivalent of six times that of Saudi Arabia today – needs to be brought on stream between 2007 – 2030. Therefore, it is unlikely that global oil production will be able to supply projected global demand within the near future.
Business as usual (BAU) oil demand is projected to increase by 1% per year on average from 2007 – 2030 – from 84.7 million barrels per day (mbpd) in 2008 to 105.2 mbpd in 2030. Under BAU, oil production is projected to grow from 83.1 mbpd in 2008 to 103 mbpd in 2030 (see Figure 15). Undiscovered oil fields account for about 20% of total crude oil production by 2030. In other words, no one knows whether or how there will be enough oil to supply 20% of total projected crude oil production by 2030.
The remaining oil is becoming increasingly harder to access and extract, and it is of increasingly lower quality. Therefore, the energy and economic investment required to produce the remaining oil is increasing as the energy yield from reserves is decreasing – i.e., the energy return on investment (EROI) is decreasing. The present EROI for oil is significantly lower than the past EROI for oil; and future EROI for oil will be even lower (see Figure 11).
Conventional oil is a fluid that generally requires minimal processing prior to sale and consumption. Conventional oil from producing fields currently supply approximately 85% of the global liquid fuel mix. Unconventional oil may be found in a variety of reserve formations and viscosities (i.e., thicknesses) that typically require specialized extraction technology (e.g., mining, injection of solvents) and significant processing prior to sale and consumption.
Unconventional oil generally includes extra-heavy oil, oil sands, oil shales, coal-to-liquids (CTL) and gas-to-liquids (GTL). These unconventional oil resources may supply less than 7% of projected global demand by 2030 (see Figure 15). It is unlikely that unconventional oil resources will be able to significantly replace conventional oil supplies in the future. The EROI of these unconventional oil resources is lower than that of conventional oil. Unconventional oil resources have greater environmental impacts associated with them, including higher CO2 emissions. Unconventional oil resources cost at least 2 – 3 times more to produce than conventional oil; so it is likely that oil prices for consumers may increase proportionally (see Table 2, and Figures 12 and 13).
Electricity generation from alternative energy resources (i.e., wind, solar, tidal, geothermal) will not be able to replace oil as a transportation fuel since much of the entire world fleet of automobiles, ships, trains, and aircraft would have to be replaced by electric-powered vehicles. Furthermore, such alternative energy resources cannot replace oil as a petrochemical feedstock.
Most biofuel crops are not feasible for replacing oil on a large-scale due to their enormous requirements for cropland and nutrients (i.e., fertilizers) (see Table 3). The projected share of biofuels in the total global supply of road transport fuels will increase from 1.5% in 2007 to 5% in 2030 assuming BAU (see Figure 15). Biofuels from algae and other microorganisms may potentially be a substitute for petroleum, but high capital and economic costs; and requirements for large areas of land, water, phosphorus and other nutrients (i.e., fertilizers) will likely prevent future algal and microbial oil production from replacing oil on a global-scale. In particular, peak phosphorus resources will severely limit the viability of large-scale algae production.
Furthermore, the peak global production of coal, natural gas, and uranium resources may occur by 2020 – 2030 (see Figure 72), if not sooner. Global peak coal production will likely occur between 2011 – 2025 (see Figures 65 and 66). Global natural gas production will likely peak sometime between 2019 – 2030 (see Figure 68). Global peak uranium will likely occur by 2015 to sometime in the 2020's (see Figures 69 and 70). Since oil is used to produce, distribute, and build and maintain the infrastructure for coal, gas, unconventional oil, nuclear and renewable energy resources, the decline in oil production could very simply bring about declines in the production rates of the other energy resources sooner than the above dates indicate. Peak oil thusly may cause peak energy resources to occur sooner.
Global peak energy will be delayed only if: (1) one or more major new primary energy sources are discovered or developed that are comparable in quantity, quality, and versatility to fossil fuels (especially oil and liquid fuels); (2) significant breakthroughs occur in the quantity, quality, and/or versatility associated with one or more existing primary energy sources; and/or (3) a substantial and sustained decrease in the level of human energy consumption occurs. If either or both of the first two caveats do not occur, then the third caveat must come true, either through a reduction of per capita energy consumption and/or by a decrease in human population.
http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/images/articles/2008_10/1662/u1_uncle-sam-bruised-economy.gif
The conclusions of this analysis are supported by publications and statements made by several national governments, the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, the U.S. Department of Energy (see Figures 8a and 8b), the U.S. and German militaries, leading energy information reporting agencies, the oil industry, the private sector (see Figures 9a and 9b), science, and academia. Part of the reason why the general public are unaware of peak oil is because oil data in the public domain is often misreported, greatly inflated, and sometimes falsified.
Contradictions and ambiguity in public data are mainly due to a lack of binding international standards to report oil reserve volume and grade; the conditions at which oil resources may be classified as commercially exploitable reserves; intentional misreporting and falsifying data to further financial and political agendas; lack of transparency and auditing; and uncertainty in technical assessments. The oil resource data and assessments of OPEC (see Figures 3, 4, and 5), information and reporting agencies that monitor the oil industry (including the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Energy Information Agency (EIA)) (see Figures 8a and 8b), and private industry are also called into question.
Buried in caveats and overly optimistic wording (see Figure 15), the estimates and figures of reporting agencies indicate that the global supply of oil will likely not be able to keep up with projected BAU demand, and that great oil supply shortages will likely start to occur within the next few years (see Figures 8a and 8b), if not sooner.
The economic theory on which the economy is based assumes inexpensive and unlimited energy supplies. The global and industrialized economy is based on fractional reserve banking, compound interest, debt-based growth, and compound or unlimited growth. Credit forms the basis of the monetary system.
In a growing economy debt and interest can be repaid; in a declining economy they cannot be repaid. Therefore, declining energy flows (i.e., oil) cannot maintain the economic production required to service debt. When outstanding debt cannot be repaid, new credit will become scarce; and economic growth will decline.
Peak oil will have systemic effects throughout the entire global civilization. Global civilization is locked into a very complex and interrelated world economy. Any attempt to alter significantly the energy and transportation infrastructure and the global economy on which it is based would cause it to collapse – but without an increasing energy supply (i.e., oil), the infrastructure and economy on which our civilization is based cannot survive.
The principle driving mechanisms for a global economic collapse are re-enforcing positive feedback cycles that are non-linear, mutually reinforcing, and not exclusive. A principle initial driver of the collapse process will be growing awareness and action about peak oil. Systemic collapse will evolve as a systemic crisis as the integrated infrastructure and economy of our global civilization breaks down. Most governments and societies – especially those that are developed and industrialized – will be unable to manage multiple simultaneous systemic crises. Systemic collapse will likely result in widespread confusion, fear, human security risks, social break down, changes in geopolitics, conflict, and war. With the collapse of the globalized economy, many communities will have to develop localized economies and food production.
Oil shortages will lead to a collapse of the global economy, and the decline of globalized industrial civilization. Systemic collapse will evolve as a systemic crisis as the integrated infrastructure and economy of our global civilization breaks down. Most governments and societies – especially those that are developed and industrialized – will be unable to manage multiple simultaneous systemic crises. Consequently, systemic collapse will likely result in widespread confusion, fear, human security risks, and social break down. Economies worldwide are already unraveling and becoming insolvent as the global economic system can no longer support itself without cheap and abundant energy resources.
This current transition of rapid economic decline was triggered by the oil price shock starting in 2007 and culminating in the summer of 2008. This transition will likely accelerate and become more volatile once oil prices exceed $80 – $90 per barrel for an extended time. Demand destruction for oil may be somewhere above $80 per barrel and below $141 per barrel. Economic recovery (i.e., business as usual) will likely exacerbate the global recession by driving up oil prices.
A managed “de-growth” is impossible, because effective mitigation of peak oil will be dependent on the implementation of mega-projects and mega-changes at the maximum possible rate with at least 20 years lead time and trillions of dollars in investments. Peak oil and the events associated with it will be an unprecedented discontinuity in human and geologic history.
Adaptation is the only strategy in response to peak oil. Mitigation and adaptation are the only solutions for climate change. Existential crises will soon confront societies with the opportunity to recreate themselves based on their respective needs, culture, resources, and governance responses. If the international community does not make a transcendent effort to cooperate to manage the transition to a non-oil based economy, it may risk a volatile, chaotic, and dangerous collapse of the global economy and world population.
Humanity has already passed the threshold for dangerous anthropogenic interference with the natural climate system. Future climate change has the potential to substantially reduce the human carrying capacity of the Earth by 0.5 – 2 billion people, or more with abrupt and non-linear climate changes. Currently, many nations are dealing with climate change impacts that are resulting from shifts in the onset of seasons; irregular, unpredictable rainfall patterns; uncommonly heavy rainfall; increased incidence of storms; major flood events; and prolonged droughts. Further, changes in temperatures and weather patterns have driven the emergence of diseases and pests that affect crops, trees, and animals. All these climate impacts already have a direct impact on the quality and quantity of crop yields, and the availability and price of food, animal feed, and fiber.
In 2010, the eight month mean (January 2010 – August 2010) global atmospheric concentration of CO2 was approximately 391 parts per million (ppm) (see Figure 33). The average global atmospheric CO2 concentration currently increases at a rate of approximately 2 ppm per year. By 2030 and 2050, atmospheric CO2 concentrations will respectively be at least 431 ppm and 471 ppm or more assuming current BAU emissions trends. As of 2005, cumulative GHG emissions may have already committed the planet to a warming of 2.4ºC (within a range of 1.4º – 4.3ºC) above the preindustrial mean temperatures. Even if all anthropogenic GHG emissions cease in 2010 (an extremely unlikely scenario), thereby limiting atmospheric CO2 concentration to 391 ppm, the climate system may have already passed the 2°C threshold for dangerous climate change. As CO2 concentrations approach 441 ppm a corresponding committed warming of 3.1oC will occur by 2030 in the absence of strong countervailing mitigation. At the current rate of GHG emissions, a CO2 concentration of 450 ppm could be reached by around 2040.
A CO2 concentration of order 450 ppm or greater, if long maintained, would push the Earth toward an ice-free state and that such a CO2 level likely would cause the passing of climate tipping points and initiate dynamic responses that could be out of humanity’s control. Abrupt, non-linear changes are caused by small increases in global climate change that result in large and irreversible environmental changes once climate tipping points are passed. Anthropogenic GHG emissions are driving the global climate system toward such tipping points earlier than previously predicted. The potential impacts of passing such climate tipping points would be
catastrophic, and include (see Figure 60):
* the disappearance of Arctic summer sea ice (see Figures 50 and 51),
* a major reduction of the area and volume of Hindu-Kush-Himalaya-Tibetan Plateau (HKHT) glaciers, which provide the head-waters for most major river systems of Asia including the Indus, Ganges, Irrawaddy, Mekong, Red, Yangtze, and Yellow rivers (almost 30% of the world’s population lives in the watersheds of these rivers) (see Figures 40 and 41),
* ocean acidification (see Figures 52 – 55),
* the deglaciation of Greenland Ice Sheet (see Figure 56),
* the dieback of Amazonian and boreal forests (see Figure 57),
* the shutdown of the Atlantic Thermohaline Circulation (see Figure 58),
* the collapse of West Antarctic Ice Sheet (see Figure 59), and
* a mass extinction event (see Figures 25, 31, and 32).
http://farm3.static.flickr.com/2702/4195801110_0878e8a317.jpg
The catastrophic impacts from these events could include many meters of sea level rise, massive displacement and loss of people and wildlife, severe loss of biodiversity, mass extinction of species and ecosystems, extreme climate events, megadroughts, catastrophic water shortages, and massive famines that could result in chronic economic depressions, political instability, social revolutions, resource wars, overwhelming humanitarian crises, and human rights challenges. Passing climate tipping points would likely cause other severe impacts, such as the release of CO2 and methane from permafrost and ocean hydrates that would likely cause additional runaway climate feedbacks that could accelerate further climate change.
A target atmospheric concentration of CO2 of no greater than 350 ppm will likely be needed to prevent the world from passing climate tipping points. However, a target concentration of CO2 of 300 ppm may be needed to ensure that the climate does not pass the 2ºC threshold.
Substantial reductions in anthropogenic GHG emissions post-peak oil, combined with major efforts in carbon sequestration would be necessary to achieve this implausible target. Temperature tipping points for abrupt and non-linear climate changes could be passed within this century, or even in the next decade. Even if climate tipping points are not crossed, committed climate change that is already “in the pipeline” will likely have severe negative impacts on most water resources, food production systems,
economies, and ecosystems worldwide.
Since the advent of the Green Revolution in 1950, the success of modern industrialized agriculture is primarily due to its increased use of fossil fuel resources for fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation to raise crops. Fossil fuel energy inputs greatly increased the energyintensiveness of agricultural production, in some cases by 100 times or more. In particular, oil has been used on a global industrial scale to:
* produce pesticides and other agrochemicals (herbicides, fungicides, some synthetic fertilizers);
* produce pharmaceuticals and medical supplies for livestock;
* fuel tractors, sprayers and crop dusters, farm equipment, and vehicles to produce food;
* pump and transport water for irrigation;
* make plastic materials for irrigation and other infrastructure;
* transport materials to farms;
* transport food from field to processors, storage, distributors, and consumers; and to
* make plastic materials in which to contain, store, and package food.
In terms of energy resources, the human carrying capacity of the Earth may be even lower based on historical relationships between global population and energy resource use, since the availability of all energy resources may limit the size of the global human population. The consumption of abundant fossil fuel energy has allowed the human population to increase greatly from approximately 0.5 billion before the year 1700 to about 7 billion today (see Figure 72). Until around 1500, the global human population had never exceeded 0.5 billion people (see Figure 24 and 72). By 1800, approximately 1 billion people lived on the Earth at the beginning of the the Industrial Revolution when fossil fuel energy was beginning to be exploited on a large-scale. Since the advent of modern industrialized agriculture around 1950, the global population has increased from 2.5 billion to nearly 7 billion in 2010 (see Figure 24, 61, and 72).
Decreasing energy resources may decrease the global human population that depends on them. Without enormous amounts of energy that oil and other fossil fuel energy resources have supplied for the past two centuries, the human carrying capacity of the Earth may be as low as 0.5 – 2.5 billion people.
Therefore, the total estimated human carrying capacity of the planet is 0.5 – 7.5 billion by 2050, and 0.5 – 6 billion by 2100, assuming that no abrupt and non-linear climate changes, a rapid mass extinction event, a global conflict (e.g., nuclear war) or any other massive environmental catastrophe occurs. Yet, the projected global human population is 9.2 billion people by 2050. This analysis only considered minimally adequate per capita food and energy supplies. The more resource-intense are the economies and lifestyles of the global population, the lower will be the potential carrying capacity. The human response to peak oil and environmental management practices will be a key factor affecting the potential human carrying capacity of the Earth.
Ironically, peak oil and energy resources may offer the only viable solution for humanity to mitigate anthropogenic climate change on a global scale – by essentially pulling the plug on the engine of the global economy that has driven the climate system to a very dangerous state. Nevertheless, this potential mitigation of climate change will not stop the committed climate changes that are expected to occur in the future, nor will it stop all anthropogenic sources of greenhouse gas emissions altogether.
It is possible that climate negotiations may be abandoned or at least marginalized for a long time (if not permanently) as the crisis of peak oil and economic shock and awe overwhelms the stability and security of every nation. It will likely require a concerted and transcendent effort on the part of any remaining international climate negotiators, their governments, and the public to pursue a meaningful international climate policy – much less a binding international climate treaty.
End of excerpts. See original posting for link to complete PDF or a hardcopy book version.
http://blogs.creativeloafing.com/dailyloaf/files/2010/05/Transition-Movement1.jpg
Author and Organization
Tariel Mórrígan earned his B.A. in Physics from the University of California at Santa Barbara. He received his Master in Environmental Science and Management (MESM) from the Donald Bren School of Environmental Science and Management at UC Santa Barbara, where he specialized in climate change, conservation, and political economics. Mórrígan is currently the principal research associate of Global Climate Change, Human Security & Democracy (GCCHSD) and a member of its Global Academic Council. His most recent publication is Peak Energy, Climate Change, and the Collapse of Global Civilization: The Current Peak Oil Crisis.
Global Climate Change, Human Security & Democracy (GCCHSD) is a four-year project administered under the auspices of the Orfalea Center for Global & International Studies at UC Santa Barbara. GCCHSD analyzes climate change and ecological balance from the perspective of governance, democracy and human rights – and more broadly, human security. Directed by Richard Falk and Hilal Elver, the project endeavors to conduct research, meetings, a series of workshops and conferences held throughout the world; followed by publications of reports, occasional papers, and books on the challenges and proposed best practices to surmount the political dimensions of these climate and security crises. GCCHSD has organized an Academic Advisory Council and a Global Advisory Council consisting of ministers, statesmen, and specialists in order to determine how to develop and implement these practices. The Orfalea Center for Global & International Studies, directed by Mark Juergensmeyer, was established to provide an intellectual and programmatic focus and financial support and facilities for UC Santa Barbara's activities in global, international, and area studies.
http://www.treehugger.com/no-impact-man-movie-poster.jpg
KEY POINTS
* Peak oil is happening now.
* The era of cheap and abundant oil is over.
* Global conventional oil production likely peaked around 2005 – 2008 or will peak by 2011.
* “Peak oil” refers to the maximum rate of oil production, after which the rate of production enters terminal decline.
* Although there will be oil remaining in the ground when world oil production peaks, the remaining oil will become increasingly difficult and more costly to produce until the marginal financial and energy cost of producing oil exceeds the marginal profit and energy gained.
* Global oil reserve discoveries peaked in the 1960's.
* New oil discoveries have been declining since then, and the new discoveries have been smaller and in harder to access areas (e.g., smaller deepwater reserves).
* Huge investments are required to explore for and develop more reserves, mainly to offset decline at existing fields.
* An additional 64 mbpd of gross capacity – the equivalent of six times that of Saudi Arabia today – needs to be brought on stream between 2007 – 2030 to supply projected business as usual demand.
* Since mid-2004, the global oil production plateau has remained within a 4% fluctuation band, which indicates that new production has only been able to offset the decline in existing production.
* The global oil production rate will likely decline by 4 – 10.5% or more per year.
* Substantial shortfalls in the global oil supply will likely occur sometime between 2010 – 2015.
* Furthermore, the peak global production of coal, natural gas, and uranium resources may occur by 2020 – 2030, if not sooner.
* Global peak coal production will likely occur between 2011 – 2025.
* Global natural gas production will likely peak sometime between 2019 – 2030.
* Global peak uranium will likely occur by 2015 to sometime in the 2020's.
* Oil shortages will lead to a collapse of the global economy, and the decline of globalized industrial civilization.
* Systemic collapse will evolve as a systemic crisis as the integrated infrastructure and economy of our global civilization breaks down.
* Most governments and societies – especially those that are developed and industrialized – will be unable to manage multiple simultaneous systemic crises. Consequently, systemic collapse will likely result in widespread confusion, fear, human security risks, and social break down.
* Economies worldwide are already unraveling and becoming insolvent as the global economic system can no longer support itself without cheap and abundant energy resources.
* This current transition of rapid economic decline was triggered by the oil price shock starting in 2007 and culminating in the summer of 2008. This transition will likely accelerate and become more volatile once oil prices exceed $80 – $90 per barrel for an extended time. Demand destruction for oil may be somewhere above $80 per barrel and below $141 per barrel.
* Economic recovery (i.e., business as usual) will likely exacerbate the global recession by driving up oil prices.
* A managed “de-growth” is impossible, because effective mitigation of peak oil will be dependent on the implementation of mega-projects and mega-changes at the maximum possible rate with at least 20 years lead time and trillions of dollars in investments.
* Peak oil and the events associated with it will be an unprecedented discontinuity in human and geologic history.
* Adaptation is the only strategy in response to peak oil.
* Mitigation and adaptation are the only strategies for climate change.
* Peak oil crises will soon confront societies with the opportunity to recreate themselves based on their respective needs, culture, resources, and governance responses.
* The impacts of peak oil and post-peak decline will not be the same equally for everyone everywhere at any given time.
* There are probably no solutions that do not involve at the very least some major changes in lifestyles.
* Local and societal responses and adaptation strategies to peak oil and climate change will vary and be influenced based on many factors including: geography, environment, access to resources, economics, markets, geopolitics, culture, religion, and politics.
* The sooner people and societies prepare for peak oil and a post-peak oil life, the more they will be able to influence the direction of their opportunities.
* The peak oil crisis may become an opportunity to recreate and harmonize local, regional, and international relationships and cooperation.
* The localization of economies will likely occur on a massive scale, particularly the localization of the production of food, goods, and services.
* Existential crises will soon confront societies with the opportunity to recreate themselves based on their respective needs, culture, resources, and governance responses.
* If the international community does not make a transcendent effort to cooperate to manage the transition to a non-oil based economy, it may risk a volatile, chaotic, and dangerous collapse of the global economy and world population.
* One of the most important modern technologies to preserve post-peak oil may be the Internet, which can potentially help the world stay connected in terms of communications, information, and Internet technology services even after global transportation services decline.
* Peak oil and energy resources may offer the only viable solution and opportunity for humanity to mitigate anthropogenic climate change on a global scale – by essentially pulling the plug on the engine of the global economy that has driven the climate system to a very dangerous state.
* The success of the Green Revolution of modern industrial agriculture since around 1950 is primarily due to its increased use of fossil fuel resources for fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation to raise crops. Fossil fuel energy inputs greatly increased the energy-intensiveness of agricultural production, in some cases by 100 times or more.
* Since the advent of the Green Revolution, the global human population has increased from 2.5 billion in 1950 to nearly 7 billion today.
* Global demand for natural resources exceeded planet’s capacity to provide sustainably for the combined demands of the global population between 1970 – 1980.
* The global population is projected to grow to around 9.2 billion by 2050.
* Current trends in land, soil, water, and biodiversity loss and degradation, combined with potential climate change impacts, ocean acidification, a mass extinction event, and energy scarcity will significantly limit the human carrying capacity of the Earth.
* Future climate change has the potential to substantially reduce the human carrying capacity of the Earth by 0.5 – 2 billion people, or more with abrupt climate changes.
* The human carrying capacity of the Earth may be 0.5 – 7.5 billion people by 2050.
* The human carrying capacity of the planet may be 0.5 – 6 billion by 2100.
* Even when greenhouse gas emissions decline after peak oil, climate change will likely continue to be driven by human activities, but in a reduced capacity.
* Moreover, the potential mitigation of climate change due to future energy scarcity will not stop the already committed climate changes that are in the pipeline.
* It is possible that climate negotiations may be abandoned or at least marginalized for a long time (if not permanently) as the crisis of peak oil and economic shock and awe overwhelms the stability and security of every nation.
* It will likely require a concerted and transcendent effort on the part of any remaining international climate negotiators, their governments, and the public to pursue a meaningful international climate policy – much less a binding international climate treaty.
* Based on these estimates, the global population may have nearly reached or already exceeded the planet's human carrying capacity in terms of food production.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
“We are in a crisis in the evolution of human society. It's unique to both human and geologic history. It has never happened before and it can't possibly happen again. You can only use oil once. You can onlyuse metals once. Soon all the oil is going to be burned and all the metals mined and scattered.”
– M. King Hubbert1, geophysicist and energy advisor Shell Oil Company and USGS, 1983
“An additional 64 mbpd of gross capacity – the equivalent of six times that of Saudi Arabia today – needs to be brought on stream between 2007 and 2030.”
– International Energy Agency (IEA)2, 2008
“Peak oil” refers to the maximum rate of oil production, after which the rate of production enters terminal decline (see Figures 1 and 2). Although there will be oil remaining in the ground when world oil production peaks, the remaining oil will become increasingly difficult and more costly to produce until the marginal financial and energy cost of producing oil exceeds the marginal profit and energy gained.
Peak oil is happening now. The era of cheap and abundant oil is over. Global conventional oil production likely peaked around 2005 – 2008 or will peak by 2011. The peaking of oil will never be accurately predicted until after the fact.
Nevertheless, since mid-2004, the global oil production plateau has remained within a 4% fluctuation band (see Figures 20a and 20b, which indicates that new production has only been able to offset the decline in existing production. The global oil production rate will likely decline by 4 – 10.5% or more per year. Substantial shortfalls in the global oil supply will likely occur sometime between 2010 – 2015.
Global oil reserve discoveries peaked in the 1960's (see Figure 10). New oil discoveries have been declining since then, and the new discoveries have been smaller and in harder to access areas (e.g., smaller deepwater reserves). The volume of oil discovered has dropped far below the volume produced in the last two decades. In total, 507 fields are classified as ‘giant’, and account for 60% of conventional oil production. The top 110 producing oilfields produce over 50% of the global oil supply, and the most productive 10 fields contribute 20%. The top 20 oilfields contribute 27%. Production from 16 of the top 20 producing fields was also in terminal decline in 2007 (see Table 1).
Non-OPEC conventional production is projected to peak around 2010, and thereafter begin to decline. OPEC’s oil production will likely peak within the near-term. Saudi Arabia has more than 20% of the world's proven total petroleum reserves. After 2010, a steady terminal decline in oil production is projected at a depletion rate above 5% per year (see Figure 7). Huge investments are required to explore for and develop more reserves, mainly to offset decline at existing fields.
An additional 64 mbpd of gross capacity – the equivalent of six times that of Saudi Arabia today – needs to be brought on stream between 2007 – 2030. Therefore, it is unlikely that global oil production will be able to supply projected global demand within the near future.
Business as usual (BAU) oil demand is projected to increase by 1% per year on average from 2007 – 2030 – from 84.7 million barrels per day (mbpd) in 2008 to 105.2 mbpd in 2030. Under BAU, oil production is projected to grow from 83.1 mbpd in 2008 to 103 mbpd in 2030 (see Figure 15). Undiscovered oil fields account for about 20% of total crude oil production by 2030. In other words, no one knows whether or how there will be enough oil to supply 20% of total projected crude oil production by 2030.
The remaining oil is becoming increasingly harder to access and extract, and it is of increasingly lower quality. Therefore, the energy and economic investment required to produce the remaining oil is increasing as the energy yield from reserves is decreasing – i.e., the energy return on investment (EROI) is decreasing. The present EROI for oil is significantly lower than the past EROI for oil; and future EROI for oil will be even lower (see Figure 11).
Conventional oil is a fluid that generally requires minimal processing prior to sale and consumption. Conventional oil from producing fields currently supply approximately 85% of the global liquid fuel mix. Unconventional oil may be found in a variety of reserve formations and viscosities (i.e., thicknesses) that typically require specialized extraction technology (e.g., mining, injection of solvents) and significant processing prior to sale and consumption.
Unconventional oil generally includes extra-heavy oil, oil sands, oil shales, coal-to-liquids (CTL) and gas-to-liquids (GTL). These unconventional oil resources may supply less than 7% of projected global demand by 2030 (see Figure 15). It is unlikely that unconventional oil resources will be able to significantly replace conventional oil supplies in the future. The EROI of these unconventional oil resources is lower than that of conventional oil. Unconventional oil resources have greater environmental impacts associated with them, including higher CO2 emissions. Unconventional oil resources cost at least 2 – 3 times more to produce than conventional oil; so it is likely that oil prices for consumers may increase proportionally (see Table 2, and Figures 12 and 13).
Electricity generation from alternative energy resources (i.e., wind, solar, tidal, geothermal) will not be able to replace oil as a transportation fuel since much of the entire world fleet of automobiles, ships, trains, and aircraft would have to be replaced by electric-powered vehicles. Furthermore, such alternative energy resources cannot replace oil as a petrochemical feedstock.
Most biofuel crops are not feasible for replacing oil on a large-scale due to their enormous requirements for cropland and nutrients (i.e., fertilizers) (see Table 3). The projected share of biofuels in the total global supply of road transport fuels will increase from 1.5% in 2007 to 5% in 2030 assuming BAU (see Figure 15). Biofuels from algae and other microorganisms may potentially be a substitute for petroleum, but high capital and economic costs; and requirements for large areas of land, water, phosphorus and other nutrients (i.e., fertilizers) will likely prevent future algal and microbial oil production from replacing oil on a global-scale. In particular, peak phosphorus resources will severely limit the viability of large-scale algae production.
Furthermore, the peak global production of coal, natural gas, and uranium resources may occur by 2020 – 2030 (see Figure 72), if not sooner. Global peak coal production will likely occur between 2011 – 2025 (see Figures 65 and 66). Global natural gas production will likely peak sometime between 2019 – 2030 (see Figure 68). Global peak uranium will likely occur by 2015 to sometime in the 2020's (see Figures 69 and 70). Since oil is used to produce, distribute, and build and maintain the infrastructure for coal, gas, unconventional oil, nuclear and renewable energy resources, the decline in oil production could very simply bring about declines in the production rates of the other energy resources sooner than the above dates indicate. Peak oil thusly may cause peak energy resources to occur sooner.
Global peak energy will be delayed only if: (1) one or more major new primary energy sources are discovered or developed that are comparable in quantity, quality, and versatility to fossil fuels (especially oil and liquid fuels); (2) significant breakthroughs occur in the quantity, quality, and/or versatility associated with one or more existing primary energy sources; and/or (3) a substantial and sustained decrease in the level of human energy consumption occurs. If either or both of the first two caveats do not occur, then the third caveat must come true, either through a reduction of per capita energy consumption and/or by a decrease in human population.
http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/images/articles/2008_10/1662/u1_uncle-sam-bruised-economy.gif
The conclusions of this analysis are supported by publications and statements made by several national governments, the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, the U.S. Department of Energy (see Figures 8a and 8b), the U.S. and German militaries, leading energy information reporting agencies, the oil industry, the private sector (see Figures 9a and 9b), science, and academia. Part of the reason why the general public are unaware of peak oil is because oil data in the public domain is often misreported, greatly inflated, and sometimes falsified.
Contradictions and ambiguity in public data are mainly due to a lack of binding international standards to report oil reserve volume and grade; the conditions at which oil resources may be classified as commercially exploitable reserves; intentional misreporting and falsifying data to further financial and political agendas; lack of transparency and auditing; and uncertainty in technical assessments. The oil resource data and assessments of OPEC (see Figures 3, 4, and 5), information and reporting agencies that monitor the oil industry (including the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Energy Information Agency (EIA)) (see Figures 8a and 8b), and private industry are also called into question.
Buried in caveats and overly optimistic wording (see Figure 15), the estimates and figures of reporting agencies indicate that the global supply of oil will likely not be able to keep up with projected BAU demand, and that great oil supply shortages will likely start to occur within the next few years (see Figures 8a and 8b), if not sooner.
The economic theory on which the economy is based assumes inexpensive and unlimited energy supplies. The global and industrialized economy is based on fractional reserve banking, compound interest, debt-based growth, and compound or unlimited growth. Credit forms the basis of the monetary system.
In a growing economy debt and interest can be repaid; in a declining economy they cannot be repaid. Therefore, declining energy flows (i.e., oil) cannot maintain the economic production required to service debt. When outstanding debt cannot be repaid, new credit will become scarce; and economic growth will decline.
Peak oil will have systemic effects throughout the entire global civilization. Global civilization is locked into a very complex and interrelated world economy. Any attempt to alter significantly the energy and transportation infrastructure and the global economy on which it is based would cause it to collapse – but without an increasing energy supply (i.e., oil), the infrastructure and economy on which our civilization is based cannot survive.
The principle driving mechanisms for a global economic collapse are re-enforcing positive feedback cycles that are non-linear, mutually reinforcing, and not exclusive. A principle initial driver of the collapse process will be growing awareness and action about peak oil. Systemic collapse will evolve as a systemic crisis as the integrated infrastructure and economy of our global civilization breaks down. Most governments and societies – especially those that are developed and industrialized – will be unable to manage multiple simultaneous systemic crises. Systemic collapse will likely result in widespread confusion, fear, human security risks, social break down, changes in geopolitics, conflict, and war. With the collapse of the globalized economy, many communities will have to develop localized economies and food production.
Oil shortages will lead to a collapse of the global economy, and the decline of globalized industrial civilization. Systemic collapse will evolve as a systemic crisis as the integrated infrastructure and economy of our global civilization breaks down. Most governments and societies – especially those that are developed and industrialized – will be unable to manage multiple simultaneous systemic crises. Consequently, systemic collapse will likely result in widespread confusion, fear, human security risks, and social break down. Economies worldwide are already unraveling and becoming insolvent as the global economic system can no longer support itself without cheap and abundant energy resources.
This current transition of rapid economic decline was triggered by the oil price shock starting in 2007 and culminating in the summer of 2008. This transition will likely accelerate and become more volatile once oil prices exceed $80 – $90 per barrel for an extended time. Demand destruction for oil may be somewhere above $80 per barrel and below $141 per barrel. Economic recovery (i.e., business as usual) will likely exacerbate the global recession by driving up oil prices.
A managed “de-growth” is impossible, because effective mitigation of peak oil will be dependent on the implementation of mega-projects and mega-changes at the maximum possible rate with at least 20 years lead time and trillions of dollars in investments. Peak oil and the events associated with it will be an unprecedented discontinuity in human and geologic history.
Adaptation is the only strategy in response to peak oil. Mitigation and adaptation are the only solutions for climate change. Existential crises will soon confront societies with the opportunity to recreate themselves based on their respective needs, culture, resources, and governance responses. If the international community does not make a transcendent effort to cooperate to manage the transition to a non-oil based economy, it may risk a volatile, chaotic, and dangerous collapse of the global economy and world population.
Humanity has already passed the threshold for dangerous anthropogenic interference with the natural climate system. Future climate change has the potential to substantially reduce the human carrying capacity of the Earth by 0.5 – 2 billion people, or more with abrupt and non-linear climate changes. Currently, many nations are dealing with climate change impacts that are resulting from shifts in the onset of seasons; irregular, unpredictable rainfall patterns; uncommonly heavy rainfall; increased incidence of storms; major flood events; and prolonged droughts. Further, changes in temperatures and weather patterns have driven the emergence of diseases and pests that affect crops, trees, and animals. All these climate impacts already have a direct impact on the quality and quantity of crop yields, and the availability and price of food, animal feed, and fiber.
In 2010, the eight month mean (January 2010 – August 2010) global atmospheric concentration of CO2 was approximately 391 parts per million (ppm) (see Figure 33). The average global atmospheric CO2 concentration currently increases at a rate of approximately 2 ppm per year. By 2030 and 2050, atmospheric CO2 concentrations will respectively be at least 431 ppm and 471 ppm or more assuming current BAU emissions trends. As of 2005, cumulative GHG emissions may have already committed the planet to a warming of 2.4ºC (within a range of 1.4º – 4.3ºC) above the preindustrial mean temperatures. Even if all anthropogenic GHG emissions cease in 2010 (an extremely unlikely scenario), thereby limiting atmospheric CO2 concentration to 391 ppm, the climate system may have already passed the 2°C threshold for dangerous climate change. As CO2 concentrations approach 441 ppm a corresponding committed warming of 3.1oC will occur by 2030 in the absence of strong countervailing mitigation. At the current rate of GHG emissions, a CO2 concentration of 450 ppm could be reached by around 2040.
A CO2 concentration of order 450 ppm or greater, if long maintained, would push the Earth toward an ice-free state and that such a CO2 level likely would cause the passing of climate tipping points and initiate dynamic responses that could be out of humanity’s control. Abrupt, non-linear changes are caused by small increases in global climate change that result in large and irreversible environmental changes once climate tipping points are passed. Anthropogenic GHG emissions are driving the global climate system toward such tipping points earlier than previously predicted. The potential impacts of passing such climate tipping points would be
catastrophic, and include (see Figure 60):
* the disappearance of Arctic summer sea ice (see Figures 50 and 51),
* a major reduction of the area and volume of Hindu-Kush-Himalaya-Tibetan Plateau (HKHT) glaciers, which provide the head-waters for most major river systems of Asia including the Indus, Ganges, Irrawaddy, Mekong, Red, Yangtze, and Yellow rivers (almost 30% of the world’s population lives in the watersheds of these rivers) (see Figures 40 and 41),
* ocean acidification (see Figures 52 – 55),
* the deglaciation of Greenland Ice Sheet (see Figure 56),
* the dieback of Amazonian and boreal forests (see Figure 57),
* the shutdown of the Atlantic Thermohaline Circulation (see Figure 58),
* the collapse of West Antarctic Ice Sheet (see Figure 59), and
* a mass extinction event (see Figures 25, 31, and 32).
http://farm3.static.flickr.com/2702/4195801110_0878e8a317.jpg
The catastrophic impacts from these events could include many meters of sea level rise, massive displacement and loss of people and wildlife, severe loss of biodiversity, mass extinction of species and ecosystems, extreme climate events, megadroughts, catastrophic water shortages, and massive famines that could result in chronic economic depressions, political instability, social revolutions, resource wars, overwhelming humanitarian crises, and human rights challenges. Passing climate tipping points would likely cause other severe impacts, such as the release of CO2 and methane from permafrost and ocean hydrates that would likely cause additional runaway climate feedbacks that could accelerate further climate change.
A target atmospheric concentration of CO2 of no greater than 350 ppm will likely be needed to prevent the world from passing climate tipping points. However, a target concentration of CO2 of 300 ppm may be needed to ensure that the climate does not pass the 2ºC threshold.
Substantial reductions in anthropogenic GHG emissions post-peak oil, combined with major efforts in carbon sequestration would be necessary to achieve this implausible target. Temperature tipping points for abrupt and non-linear climate changes could be passed within this century, or even in the next decade. Even if climate tipping points are not crossed, committed climate change that is already “in the pipeline” will likely have severe negative impacts on most water resources, food production systems,
economies, and ecosystems worldwide.
Since the advent of the Green Revolution in 1950, the success of modern industrialized agriculture is primarily due to its increased use of fossil fuel resources for fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation to raise crops. Fossil fuel energy inputs greatly increased the energyintensiveness of agricultural production, in some cases by 100 times or more. In particular, oil has been used on a global industrial scale to:
* produce pesticides and other agrochemicals (herbicides, fungicides, some synthetic fertilizers);
* produce pharmaceuticals and medical supplies for livestock;
* fuel tractors, sprayers and crop dusters, farm equipment, and vehicles to produce food;
* pump and transport water for irrigation;
* make plastic materials for irrigation and other infrastructure;
* transport materials to farms;
* transport food from field to processors, storage, distributors, and consumers; and to
* make plastic materials in which to contain, store, and package food.
In terms of energy resources, the human carrying capacity of the Earth may be even lower based on historical relationships between global population and energy resource use, since the availability of all energy resources may limit the size of the global human population. The consumption of abundant fossil fuel energy has allowed the human population to increase greatly from approximately 0.5 billion before the year 1700 to about 7 billion today (see Figure 72). Until around 1500, the global human population had never exceeded 0.5 billion people (see Figure 24 and 72). By 1800, approximately 1 billion people lived on the Earth at the beginning of the the Industrial Revolution when fossil fuel energy was beginning to be exploited on a large-scale. Since the advent of modern industrialized agriculture around 1950, the global population has increased from 2.5 billion to nearly 7 billion in 2010 (see Figure 24, 61, and 72).
Decreasing energy resources may decrease the global human population that depends on them. Without enormous amounts of energy that oil and other fossil fuel energy resources have supplied for the past two centuries, the human carrying capacity of the Earth may be as low as 0.5 – 2.5 billion people.
Therefore, the total estimated human carrying capacity of the planet is 0.5 – 7.5 billion by 2050, and 0.5 – 6 billion by 2100, assuming that no abrupt and non-linear climate changes, a rapid mass extinction event, a global conflict (e.g., nuclear war) or any other massive environmental catastrophe occurs. Yet, the projected global human population is 9.2 billion people by 2050. This analysis only considered minimally adequate per capita food and energy supplies. The more resource-intense are the economies and lifestyles of the global population, the lower will be the potential carrying capacity. The human response to peak oil and environmental management practices will be a key factor affecting the potential human carrying capacity of the Earth.
Ironically, peak oil and energy resources may offer the only viable solution for humanity to mitigate anthropogenic climate change on a global scale – by essentially pulling the plug on the engine of the global economy that has driven the climate system to a very dangerous state. Nevertheless, this potential mitigation of climate change will not stop the committed climate changes that are expected to occur in the future, nor will it stop all anthropogenic sources of greenhouse gas emissions altogether.
It is possible that climate negotiations may be abandoned or at least marginalized for a long time (if not permanently) as the crisis of peak oil and economic shock and awe overwhelms the stability and security of every nation. It will likely require a concerted and transcendent effort on the part of any remaining international climate negotiators, their governments, and the public to pursue a meaningful international climate policy – much less a binding international climate treaty.
End of excerpts. See original posting for link to complete PDF or a hardcopy book version.
http://blogs.creativeloafing.com/dailyloaf/files/2010/05/Transition-Movement1.jpg
Author and Organization
Tariel Mórrígan earned his B.A. in Physics from the University of California at Santa Barbara. He received his Master in Environmental Science and Management (MESM) from the Donald Bren School of Environmental Science and Management at UC Santa Barbara, where he specialized in climate change, conservation, and political economics. Mórrígan is currently the principal research associate of Global Climate Change, Human Security & Democracy (GCCHSD) and a member of its Global Academic Council. His most recent publication is Peak Energy, Climate Change, and the Collapse of Global Civilization: The Current Peak Oil Crisis.
Global Climate Change, Human Security & Democracy (GCCHSD) is a four-year project administered under the auspices of the Orfalea Center for Global & International Studies at UC Santa Barbara. GCCHSD analyzes climate change and ecological balance from the perspective of governance, democracy and human rights – and more broadly, human security. Directed by Richard Falk and Hilal Elver, the project endeavors to conduct research, meetings, a series of workshops and conferences held throughout the world; followed by publications of reports, occasional papers, and books on the challenges and proposed best practices to surmount the political dimensions of these climate and security crises. GCCHSD has organized an Academic Advisory Council and a Global Advisory Council consisting of ministers, statesmen, and specialists in order to determine how to develop and implement these practices. The Orfalea Center for Global & International Studies, directed by Mark Juergensmeyer, was established to provide an intellectual and programmatic focus and financial support and facilities for UC Santa Barbara's activities in global, international, and area studies.
http://www.treehugger.com/no-impact-man-movie-poster.jpg
KEY POINTS
* Peak oil is happening now.
* The era of cheap and abundant oil is over.
* Global conventional oil production likely peaked around 2005 – 2008 or will peak by 2011.
* “Peak oil” refers to the maximum rate of oil production, after which the rate of production enters terminal decline.
* Although there will be oil remaining in the ground when world oil production peaks, the remaining oil will become increasingly difficult and more costly to produce until the marginal financial and energy cost of producing oil exceeds the marginal profit and energy gained.
* Global oil reserve discoveries peaked in the 1960's.
* New oil discoveries have been declining since then, and the new discoveries have been smaller and in harder to access areas (e.g., smaller deepwater reserves).
* Huge investments are required to explore for and develop more reserves, mainly to offset decline at existing fields.
* An additional 64 mbpd of gross capacity – the equivalent of six times that of Saudi Arabia today – needs to be brought on stream between 2007 – 2030 to supply projected business as usual demand.
* Since mid-2004, the global oil production plateau has remained within a 4% fluctuation band, which indicates that new production has only been able to offset the decline in existing production.
* The global oil production rate will likely decline by 4 – 10.5% or more per year.
* Substantial shortfalls in the global oil supply will likely occur sometime between 2010 – 2015.
* Furthermore, the peak global production of coal, natural gas, and uranium resources may occur by 2020 – 2030, if not sooner.
* Global peak coal production will likely occur between 2011 – 2025.
* Global natural gas production will likely peak sometime between 2019 – 2030.
* Global peak uranium will likely occur by 2015 to sometime in the 2020's.
* Oil shortages will lead to a collapse of the global economy, and the decline of globalized industrial civilization.
* Systemic collapse will evolve as a systemic crisis as the integrated infrastructure and economy of our global civilization breaks down.
* Most governments and societies – especially those that are developed and industrialized – will be unable to manage multiple simultaneous systemic crises. Consequently, systemic collapse will likely result in widespread confusion, fear, human security risks, and social break down.
* Economies worldwide are already unraveling and becoming insolvent as the global economic system can no longer support itself without cheap and abundant energy resources.
* This current transition of rapid economic decline was triggered by the oil price shock starting in 2007 and culminating in the summer of 2008. This transition will likely accelerate and become more volatile once oil prices exceed $80 – $90 per barrel for an extended time. Demand destruction for oil may be somewhere above $80 per barrel and below $141 per barrel.
* Economic recovery (i.e., business as usual) will likely exacerbate the global recession by driving up oil prices.
* A managed “de-growth” is impossible, because effective mitigation of peak oil will be dependent on the implementation of mega-projects and mega-changes at the maximum possible rate with at least 20 years lead time and trillions of dollars in investments.
* Peak oil and the events associated with it will be an unprecedented discontinuity in human and geologic history.
* Adaptation is the only strategy in response to peak oil.
* Mitigation and adaptation are the only strategies for climate change.
* Peak oil crises will soon confront societies with the opportunity to recreate themselves based on their respective needs, culture, resources, and governance responses.
* The impacts of peak oil and post-peak decline will not be the same equally for everyone everywhere at any given time.
* There are probably no solutions that do not involve at the very least some major changes in lifestyles.
* Local and societal responses and adaptation strategies to peak oil and climate change will vary and be influenced based on many factors including: geography, environment, access to resources, economics, markets, geopolitics, culture, religion, and politics.
* The sooner people and societies prepare for peak oil and a post-peak oil life, the more they will be able to influence the direction of their opportunities.
* The peak oil crisis may become an opportunity to recreate and harmonize local, regional, and international relationships and cooperation.
* The localization of economies will likely occur on a massive scale, particularly the localization of the production of food, goods, and services.
* Existential crises will soon confront societies with the opportunity to recreate themselves based on their respective needs, culture, resources, and governance responses.
* If the international community does not make a transcendent effort to cooperate to manage the transition to a non-oil based economy, it may risk a volatile, chaotic, and dangerous collapse of the global economy and world population.
* One of the most important modern technologies to preserve post-peak oil may be the Internet, which can potentially help the world stay connected in terms of communications, information, and Internet technology services even after global transportation services decline.
* Peak oil and energy resources may offer the only viable solution and opportunity for humanity to mitigate anthropogenic climate change on a global scale – by essentially pulling the plug on the engine of the global economy that has driven the climate system to a very dangerous state.
* The success of the Green Revolution of modern industrial agriculture since around 1950 is primarily due to its increased use of fossil fuel resources for fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation to raise crops. Fossil fuel energy inputs greatly increased the energy-intensiveness of agricultural production, in some cases by 100 times or more.
* Since the advent of the Green Revolution, the global human population has increased from 2.5 billion in 1950 to nearly 7 billion today.
* Global demand for natural resources exceeded planet’s capacity to provide sustainably for the combined demands of the global population between 1970 – 1980.
* The global population is projected to grow to around 9.2 billion by 2050.
* Current trends in land, soil, water, and biodiversity loss and degradation, combined with potential climate change impacts, ocean acidification, a mass extinction event, and energy scarcity will significantly limit the human carrying capacity of the Earth.
* Future climate change has the potential to substantially reduce the human carrying capacity of the Earth by 0.5 – 2 billion people, or more with abrupt climate changes.
* The human carrying capacity of the Earth may be 0.5 – 7.5 billion people by 2050.
* The human carrying capacity of the planet may be 0.5 – 6 billion by 2100.
* Even when greenhouse gas emissions decline after peak oil, climate change will likely continue to be driven by human activities, but in a reduced capacity.
* Moreover, the potential mitigation of climate change due to future energy scarcity will not stop the already committed climate changes that are in the pipeline.
* It is possible that climate negotiations may be abandoned or at least marginalized for a long time (if not permanently) as the crisis of peak oil and economic shock and awe overwhelms the stability and security of every nation.
* It will likely require a concerted and transcendent effort on the part of any remaining international climate negotiators, their governments, and the public to pursue a meaningful international climate policy – much less a binding international climate treaty.
* Based on these estimates, the global population may have nearly reached or already exceeded the planet's human carrying capacity in terms of food production.
From Energy Bulletin @ http://www.energybulletin.net/stories/2010-12-14/peak-energy-climate-change-and-collapse-global-civilization-current-peak-oil-cris where there is more on this topic.
Images - http://www.maxgladwell.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/peak_oil.jpg
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http://farm3.static.flickr.com/2702/4195801110_0878e8a317.jpg
http://blogs.creativeloafing.com/dailyloaf/files/2010/05/Transition-Movement1.jpg
http://www.treehugger.com/no-impact-man-movie-poster.jpg
For further enlightenment see –
The Her(m)etic Hermit - http://hermetic.blog.com
New Illuminati – http://nexusilluminati.blogspot.com
New Illuminati on Facebook - http://www.facebook.com/pages/New-Illuminati/320674219559
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Saturday, December 18, 2010
Food Values
Celebrated chef Alice Waters talks about our food choices, making changes, what it takes to be a good cook.
Photo by Aya Brackett
Alice Waters says her cooking style is as easy as slicing a fresh tomato, drizzling it with olive oil, and sprinkling it with salt and herbs. Yet that simplicity has made her one of America’s most influential chefs. It was Waters who sparked the culinary revolution called California Cuisine, defined by fresh, local ingredients prepared with skillful technique and imagination, and the restaurant she started nearly forty years ago, Chez Panisse in Berkeley, has been called the best in the country by many critics. More than just a chef, she is a philosopher of food. Her passion and her cause are the values people express in the ways they grow, cook, and eat their daily meals.
Do you think the idea of food as medicine has detracted from the pleasure of eating?
Alice Waters: What do you think? (Laughs) Good health is the outcome of living well and finding a balance in your life. I wasn’t searching for good health. I was searching for something satisfying and pleasurable.
It was living in France in the sixties that inspired your cooking style. Why was that experience so significant?
I was in France at a wonderful time. People were taking fresh baguettes from the ovens and mussels out of the water, steaming them up, and putting them on a dish. People were buying things for lunch from the marketplace and then going back in the afternoon to buy things for dinner. I loved that immediacy. Also, in France I experienced small restaurants, those neighborhood places where there wasn’t any pretension. Good food wasn’t something expensive that only certain people could afford. Everyone sat down and had conversations at the dinner table. Food was woven into the fabric of life.
Would you say you invented California Cuisine, which led to what is now known as New American Cuisine?
I don’t know what they mean by California Cuisine; cuisine takes the test of time. I’m cooking in California, yes, but I’m talking about a philosophy of food and it’s nothing new—it’s really the way people have been eating throughout most of human history. Until about fifty years ago, there was always local, seasonal, organic production of food.
What makes someone a good cook?
Paying attention, of course, and drawing on all of the senses to use ingredients in a way that brings out their flavor. But good cooking is mostly about using truly tasty, ripe fruits and vegetables. The way things are grown affects their flavor, so good cooking begins at the beginning—choosing the right seeds, planting them in the right place, taking care of the plants in the right way, picking the fruits and vegetables at the right moment, and eating them quickly thereafter.
Tell me about your relationship with farmers.
I appreciate that they grow food for my health and pleasure. The varieties of fruits and vegetables they produce are inspiring, and I feel creative when I have these ingredients to work with. I think of myself not as a consumer but as a co-producer. Farmers give me something nourishing, and I give them the money they need to continue their work. It’s hard to insist that people build community without some kind of basis. This exchange around food is so natural and so right that it can be that basis.
Why do you say that how we eat can change the world?
Certain choices about what we eat support farmers. Other choices not only destroy our natural resources and our health, but they also destroy our culture. When you eat food, you eat the values that come with it. So if you’re eating fast food, you’re eating fast, cheap, and easy, and if you’re eating slow food, you’re eating a whole other set of values.
Why is obesity so common in North America?
Obesity has to do with the availability, almost the force-feeding, of food that isn’t good for people. We will never solve the problem of obesity when we only talk about food in that fast food way. Food is not just about fueling up.
You’re working to make some changes in the American school system.
The idea is to institute a curriculum that begins in kindergarten and goes through to high school. This would be an interactive program with two labs: a garden and a kitchen. The children would learn how to prepare wholesome, affordable, delicious food, and they’d learn how to communicate at the table. There’s a whole set of values that goes naturally with growing, cooking, and serving food. These include everything from appreciating diversity and interconnectedness to learning about sharing and compassion.
This program will bring children into positive new relationships with food. If you just tell kids what not to eat, some will listen but others will just bring junk in their backpacks. Really changing the way kids eat is easy to do when you lure them with the beauty of nature and the art of the table.
The organization you started, Chez Panisse Foundation, has already established this kind of program in Berkeley.
Yes, for the last twelve years at Martin Luther King Junior Middle School we’ve been working on the Edible Schoolyard. We have both a garden and a kitchen classroom, and they have been integrated into the school curriculum.
How is it going?
Wonderfully. When children are working in the garden and helping to make their own school lunches, they become invested in a profound way. What they grow and cook, they want to eat, even the squash dishes. When children are eating something delicious, it opens up their senses to the world around them. It’s a beautiful thing to watch. Giving kids this opportunity shows them that we care.
And you also want to establish a school meal program.
I want all children to be fed breakfast and lunch at school. There would be tables with children sitting at them and other children serving and cooking. We’ve been desensitized by the fast food world, which says that kitchen work is drudgery. I want to teach kids that work is pleasure. The pleasure of work is the value I care about.
This sounds great, but is it practical?
The chef Jamie Oliver has exposed the unsatisfactory food in the British school system, and he has received national attention and money to change it. I’m interested in making that same transformation happen here in the U.S., but I think it’s important that the change be connected to an edible education curriculum. Nobody knows how to cook anymore. Nobody knows how to eat at the table. As many as 85 percent of kids don’t eat one meal a day with their family. So I’m envisioning that we put food education into the curriculum in the same way that we put physical education into the curriculum forty years ago. We built gyms and tracks and hired teachers and spent a lot of money. That’s what we need to do again, but this time centering on food.
How does your idea for school meals relate to your passion for the environment?
The children would eat locally produced and sustainably farmed food. This would make the schools an economic engine for sustainable agriculture and slow food values.
Is there a spiritual philosophy behind all of your work with food?
Yes: food is precious. It’s what we all have in common and it’s a daily practice.
Raising Healthy Children
If you are a new parent or a parent-to-be or a person who might become a parent one day, read on and start empowering yourself now. Here are the main things to know, followed by a list of dos and don'ts.
Lesson #1: Toxins to which you, yourself, are exposed in advance of pregnancy may impact the health of children to come. Guys, this applies to you, too. Your sperm may develop improperly and the DNA you pass on may be affected.
Lesson #2: During pregnancy, toxins to which you are exposed may alter the way the fetus's organs and systems develop or contribute to cancer later.
Lesson #3: Babies and young children remain highly vulnerable to toxic substances, as their organs and systems are still in development.
Where are toxic chemicals encountered? In food, water, paint, soap, lawn care products, baby bottles, lunch boxes, furniture—the list goes on and on. Basically, they have infiltrated all areas of our lives, not as part of some nefarious scheme by corporations to endanger our health, but as a way of tapping into our desire for greater safety (for example, with flame-retardant pajamas), convenience (plastic sippy cups) and attractiveness (scented shampoo). Yet these chemicals do bring with them serious health risks, intended or not, especially to the very young.
By the way, I am not talking about the risk of acute problems that occur shortly after exposure, such as dizziness, rashes or poisoning. When these risks are present, there is usually a warning on the label alerting you to them. No, I am referring to long-term harm that shows up later in life—for instance, as infertility, reduced cognitive function or, as mentioned above, cancer. The long time lag between exposure and outcome makes it hard for people to see the relationship (and easy for companies to deny the problem), which hampers regulation, but a large body of scientific evidence shows clear links.
Following is a compendium of steps you can take to reduce exposure to these invisible dangers and protect the health of your child. Please don't approach it with an "all or nothing" mentality. "All" is for superhumans only. Instead, pick a few steps that are achievable for you. Remember, any step you do take will keep your child safer than he or she otherwise would be.
What to do prior to pregnancy (applies to men and women)
- Use safer cosmetics, shampoos, soaps and other personal care items. To reduce exposure to phthalates, choose unscented or naturally scented products and avoid nail polish or get phthalate-free brands. You may also want to get paraben-free products, as parabens are suspected endocrine disruptors. And make sure your lipstick is lead-free. Find the safest brands in the Cosmetic Safety Database.
- Don't use pesticides in your home. Old-fashioned cleanliness helps prevent pests and there are other safe pest control methods. If you do need insecticides, use baits or traps.
- Don't use pesticides on your pets. To keep fleas and ticks at bay, regularly comb and bathe your pets, wash their bedding, vacuum and keep grass and bushes around the house clipped. If you need a pest treatment product, use flea control pills.
- Don't use pesticides in your yard. Try organic techniques and planting native plants, which are more resistant to native pests.
- Use natural cleaning products, such as white vinegar and baking soda or non-toxic brands.
- Do not use scented air fresheners, which can expose you to phthalates.
- Eat organic food as much as possible, especially organic animal products (milk, cheese and eggs as well as meat).
- Eat less meat and, in particular, less fatty meat. (Many toxins are stored in animal fat, including our own.)
- Steer clear of fish high in mercury. Use NRDC's Guide to Mercury in Fish to see which fish are safe.
- Avoid eating canned food or canned soda, as cans are lined with BPA.
- Have your tap water tested for lead. Here is info on water testing. Also get the latest water quality report from your water supplier. If the lead level is above the safety threshold or there are other serious safety issues, use bottled water. Otherwise, stick with tap, which is better regulated. You may also want to filter your water. When you first use water in the morning or after several hours, run it till it turns cold to reduce lead exposure.
- Have your house tested for lead if you notice peeling or flaking paint and the house was built before 1978 when paint became lead-free. Learn more from the EPA lead page.
- Don't drink alcohol if you're trying to have a baby or might be trying soon. And don't smoke or take "recreational" drugs. Check with your doctor about the safety of over-the-counter and prescribed drugs.
- ALL OF THE ABOVE, as applied to your child, plus...
- Breastfeed your baby if you can. Breast milk provides better nutrition than formula and helps to protect children from disease and infection.
- Avoid hard, transparent plastic baby bottles and sippy cups, which may be made with BPA. Do not warm up milk in a plastic baby bottle. Heat may cause chemicals to leach from the plastic into the milk. You can warm up glass bottles, however.
- Only microwave food in glass containers.
- Prepare your child's meals from scratch to limit sweeteners, salt, fat and additives—and to include healthy ingredients. Buy organic foods as much as possible, especially when it comes to foods your child consumes a lot of, such as milk and apples (or apple juice) and foods with high levels of pesticide residues.
- Get your child all the recommended vaccinations. Today's vaccines are mercury-free and there is no evidence they are dangerous, while it is a fact that they protect kids (yours and others they come in contact with) from life-threatening illnesses.
- Only give your child antibiotics for bacterial illnesses or infections. Overuse and misuse of antibiotics—e.g., to combat viruses—can lead to antibiotic-resistant superbugs.
- Don't use antibacterial soaps and cleansers made with triclosan or triclocarban. Instead wash hands well with regular soap and hot water for 20-30 seconds or use alcohol-based sanitizers.
- Instead of buying furniture and other products made with chlorinated flame retardants, use good fire prevention practices.
- ALL OF THE ABOVE as applied to your older child, plus...
- Avoid school supplies made with vinyl (PVC plastic), such as plastic lunch boxes and notebooks with plastic-coated spiral bindings. Get more information from the Guide to PVC-free School Supplies.
- Teach your child about the health risks in cosmetics and other personal care products so he or she will make good choices.
- When you buy your child a cell phone, buy a wired headset, too. A link between cell phone use and brain cancer is a distinct possibility so the phone should not be pressed against the head—or, in fact, any part of the body.
Wednesday, December 15, 2010
The Global City Indicators
The Global City Indicators Program is structured around 22 “themes” organized into two Categories that measure a range of city services and quality of life factors. These Categories and themes are listed below:
City Services – includes services provided by city governments and other entities.
Quality of Life – includes critical contributors to overall quality of life, but are not the direct responsibility of any local service provider.
City performance relative to each of these themes is measured by a suite of several indicators, which collectively tell a “story”. Overall, 94 indicators have been proposed (see Table 1). Recognizing the differences in resources and capabilities between developed and developing world cities, the overall set of 94 indicators has been divided into 27 “core” indicators, which all cities participating in the initiative would be expected to report on, 26 “supporting” indicators, which all cities would be encouraged, but not expected, to report on, and 41 desirable future indicators which are indicators that have been identified by the Partner Cities as being desirable but that for which a consistent, global methodology has not yet been identified. This set of global city indicators was selected based on significant input from the partner cities, ensuring that these indicators reflect city information needs and interests, and a rigorous screening process. The indicators must be:
- Available, up to date, and able to be reported annually;
- Readily comparable among cities globally;
- Relevant for public policy decision making and/or linked to established goals (e.g. MDG);
- Cost effective to collect;
- Meaningful to cities across the globe regardless of geography, culture, affluence, size, or political structure;
- Understandable and not overly complex;
- Clear as to whether changes in the indicators are good or bad.
| Table 1: Global City Indicators |
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